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A multiyear regional  risk programming  model  was used  in evaluating the  impacts of different
environmental  policies  on  cropping  systems,  input use,  nonpoint source pollution,  farm
income, and risk.  A direct  expected  utility maximizing problem  (DEMP)  objective  with  a Von
Neuman  Morgenstem  utility  function was  used in deriving optimal  cropping  systems.  A
biophysical  simulation model provided input for the  optimization. Three  types of
policies-taxing, regulating the  aggregate,  and regulating  the per acre level-were studied  for
two  farm  inputs-nitrogen and atrazine.  It was observed that  policies had varied  and multiple
cross-effects  on pollutant  loads, farm  income, and risk. This  information  is  crucial  in
developing  successful policies  toward improving  water quality.  If an appropriate  input policy
is chosen,  both targeted and nontargeted pollutant  loads can  be managed. The three  policies
varied  in their effects  on pollutant loads  and involved tradeoffs  in water  quality and  economic
attributes.
Agriculture  remains  a  major  source  of  nonpoint  implications  that need careful  analysis in address-
source  (NPS)  pollution.  Erwin  (1988)  estimated  ing the problem of water quality deterioration.  For
that  NPS  pollution  deteriorates  water  quality  in  example,  direct policies  such as taxes  on fertilizer
64%  of  rivers  and  57%  of  lakes  in  the  United  are easier to implement and enforce within existing
States.  Annual  loss  through  sediment  alone  has  input markets.  However, less information exists  on
been  estimated  to  be  2.2  billion  dollars  in  this  their economic and water quality implications  in a
country  (Clark,  Haverkamp,  and Chapman  1985).  risk programming  framework.
Chemical contaminants  like fertilizer and pesticide  Policies  like taxing  and regulating  input use, in
residues from agricultural lands reduce  the quality  addition  to reducing  input use,  have  spillover ef-
of  surface  and  ground  water  at  both  on-site  and  fects  on  other  forms  of  agricultural  nonpoint
off-site  locations.  Protecting  water  quality  from  source pollutant loads,  income,  and risk levels.  In
these  extemalities  is  an  important  public  policy  other words,  those policies that are directed toward
issue. Policies  to protect water quality can be clas-  a particular  input (e.g.,  nitrogen)  have a direct  ef-
sified as either broad-based  or micro-targeted,  ac-  fect on the targeted pollutant,l  an indirect effect on
cording  to  their  level  of  administration.  Broad-  nontargeted  contaminants  (phosphorus,  sediments,
based  policies  include  Pigouvian  taxes  (Baumol  etc.), and an indirect effect on economic attributes.
and Oates  1988),  per acre  and aggregate  input use  The  economic  variables  that  are  affected  by  such
regulation  (Mapp  et  al.  1994), restricting  per acre  policies  include  income  and financial risk. Disag-
and  aggregate  emission  levels,  permit  trading  gregating effects  on mean and variance  of income
(Baumol  and  Oates  1988),  and  land  retirement  can  provide  better information  on policy  implica-
(Young  and  Osborn  1990).  The  micro-targeted  tions.  The  spillover  effects  on  other  nonpoint
policies concentrate on specific soils, cropping sys-  source pollutants are not clear in the current litera-
tems,  irrigation systems,  or locations  within a wa-  ture. Policies resulting from  an assumption  of less
tershed  (Mapp  et  al.  1994;  Braden  et  al.  1989;
Lovejoy,  Lee,  and Beasley  1985).  These  policies
often involve varying economic  and environmental  We define  targeted  pollutants  with respect  to a  particular policy as
representing the chemical derivatives of the input directly affected by the
policy instrument;  that is, in the case of restricting nitrogen use, targeted
pollutants are  organic  nitrogen, nitrates in surface and subsurface  water,
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or nonexistent  spillover  effects  can result in  sub-  chastic  or  deterministic),  and  (4)  the  method  of
optimal levels of emission reduction or  ineffective  estimating pollutant loading (fixed delivery ratio or
economic  policies.  Studying  the  cross-effects  of  variable estimation).  Several approaches have been
policies  aimed at reducing  agricultural  NPS pollu-  used to  study  the  impact  of agricultural  practices
tion can provide better information for local, state,  on water  quality. In particular,  process simulation
and federal  agencies charged  with  improving  sur-  models have been used extensively to assess policy
face  water.  impacts  on  water  quality.  For example,  Lovejoy,
In the  formulating  of appropriate  water  quality  Lee,  and Beasley  (1985)  used  ANSWERS  (Areal
policies,  information  deficiency  is  identifiable  at  Nonpoint  Source  Watershed  Environment  Re-
both the policy  and methodological  levels.  On  the  sponse  Simulator)  to  evaluate  the  cost-effective-
policy side, the  implications of policies on nontar-  ness  of several  micro-targeting  policies  to reduce
geted  pollutants  and  farm  risk  have  not  always  sediment yields in an Indiana watershed. Likewise,
been  considered.  Interpretation  of information  on  Braden et al.  (1989) used the  SEDEC (SEDiment
the nature of simultaneous adjustments in cropping  EConomics)  model  to  evaluate  optimal  spatial
sequences,  input  use  levels,  substitution  in  crop-  management  of sediment  in an Illinois  watershed.
ping systems, profits, and risk facing the producers  Phillips  et  al.  (1993)  used the EPIC (Erosion  Pro-
requires  a  holistic  framework.  On  the  modeling  ductivity  Impact  Calculator)  model  to  study  the
side,  the use of a direct  expected  utility risk pro-  responses  of  soil  erosion  and  exports  to  several
gramming  framework  to  optimize  cropping  sys-  tillage  and  crop  rotation  practices  in  Illinois.  Fi-
tems  over  time  can  capture  producer  behavior,  nally,  Kozloff,  Taff,  and  Wang  (1992)  used  the
which  can lead  to better  estimation  of policy  im-  AGNPS  (Agricultural NonPoint  Source  pollution)
plications  on  producer  risk and water  quality pa-  model  to  study  the  effectiveness  of  targeting
rameters.  This is because  of the model's  lower re-  schemes  with respect  to  budget outlays  and  sedi-
liance on  assumptions  underlying  the  distribution  ment yields.
of stochastic  variables. Also at the modeling level,  Other studies have combined simulation models
an understanding of the cross-effects of water qual-  with  mathematical  programming  routines  to  ad-
ity policies  is important  for successful  policy de-  dress  water  quality  issues.  For example,  Mapp  et
sign. This study attempts to fill some of these voids  al.  (1994) used EPIC-PST along with a mathemati-
in the water  quality literature.  cal programming model to study the impact of lim-
This  study  uses  a multiyear  risk  programming  iting  nitrogen use  at various  levels  on the  Central
model  and  a  biophysical  simulator  to  investigate  High Plains.  Teague,  Bernardo,  and  Mapp  (1995)
the  economic  and  environmental  implications  of  also used  EPIC-PST along  with a farm-level  Tar-
taxing  and regulating  farm inputs  directed toward  get-MOTAD  model  to evaluate  income  and envi-
reducing  nonpoint  source  pollution  from  agricul-  ronmental  tradeoffs.  Taylor,  Adams,  and  Miller
tural  lands. Specifically,  we study the effect of se-  (1992), used linear programming along with a bio-
lected  environmental  policies  on  crop production  physical simulator to  study the effect of economic
decisions,  input  use,  water  quality,  soil  erosion,  incentives  to  offset  nonpoint  source  pollution.
producer income, and farm risk in the White River  None  of  the  above  studies  used  the  Direct  Ex-
Basin in Central  Indiana. A direct expected  utility  pected Utility Maximizing  (DEMP)  framework  of
maximization  formulation was used to model pro-  risk  analysis.  This  study  estimates  economic  and
ducer  behavior.  The economic  and environmental  water  quality  implications  of policy  using  a  risk
impacts  of  taxing nitrogen  and pesticide  use  and  programming  framework  to  evaluate  alternative
restricting  their use  at the aggregate  (entire  water-  policies  related  to  nitrogen  and  pesticide  use  in
shed) and per acre levels were analyzed. Responses  agriculture.
of  targeted  and  nontargeted  pollutants,  farm  in-
come,  and  risk  (variance  in  income)  to  various
policy instruments were assessed  at varying policy  The Model
intensities.
Farmers in the watershed are assumed to maximize
expected  utility of wealth  under a stochastic envi-
Background Literature ronment  defined in equation  (1):
Water quality studies can be classified based on (1)  (1)  Max EU(WS),
the  level  of application  (watershed  level  or  farm  XI
level),  (2)  the  level  of  targeting  (broad-based  or  where  U(.)  is  a Von Neuman  Morgenstern  utility
micro-targeting),  (3)  the incorporation  of risk (sto-  function,  which  is concave,  continuous,  and  twiceRandhir and Lee  Impacts of Reducing Nitrogen and Pesticide Use  41
differentiable.  Ws is the  wealth in state  s (s  =  1,  Variance  (E-V) representation.  The DEMP formu-
. . ., q) and EU(.) is the expected utility over states.  lation is of the form:
Wealth  in  state  s  is  determined  by  equation  (2),
where R(xs) is net return in state s, x5 is  a vector of  MAX  =  , U(W)
activities  in  state s,  and WO is the initial  wealth.  Xs  s= 
(2)  Ws =  Wo + R(x,)  V s  =  ...  q.  where Hs is the probability of occurrence of the sth
The resources  allocated  to activities  are limited  state.  A negative  exponential  utility function
to  an endowment  B  as an inequality  constraint in  (W,)  =  - e-P  for p  > 0
equation  (3):
was used in  the study,  because  it represents  con-
(3)  A x - B  stant absolute risk aversion  (CARA)  over changes
where,  A is the technology  matrix. The income  in  in  wealth.  The term  p  is the risk  aversion  param-
each  state  is  net profit from production  activities  eter
calculated  as in  equation(4):  The  activities  in  the  model  included  crop  se-
quences  (continuous  corn,  corn-soybean,  corn-
(4)  R(xs)=  (Cs Xs - rss),  alfalfa,  and corn-soybean-wheat),  input-use levels
~X5,~~~  '  '  (low input use, medium input use, and  high input
use),  and  tillage  (conventional  tillage,  minimum
where,  c s represents the product prices and r  is the  biophysical simulator, the tillage, and no tillage). A biophysical simulator, the per unit cost in inputs  of practice (p) under state  . Erosion  Productivity  Impact  Calculator  (EPIC Erosion  Productivity  Impact  Calculator  (EPIC/ Biophysical  and production processes  involved  in  WQ2) (Williams et al.  1989),  was used to simulate
the  system  are represented  by equation  (5),  where  processes  in the crop yields and other biophysical processes  in
M, represents  the production  environment  facing M, represents  the  production  environment  facig  equations  (5)  and  (6).  Validation of the yields  for
the farmer (weather,  soil conditions, etc.), and  (.)  e  c  s  each  cropping  systems  (involving  corn,  soybean,
is the relationship  involved in activity x,: is  the  relationship  involved  in activity x:  wheat,  and alfalfa  crops)  was done  for various in-
(5)  x  = % (Ps. M2 s  B).  put levels and planting dates.  Calibration  and vali-
dation of the results of the  EPIC model follow the
The  nonpoint  source  pollution  loading  (N)  is  procedures  used  by  Foltz  et  al.  (1995).  The  pre-
generated  according to equation  (6),  where  p(.)  is  dicted  yields  were  validated  by  comparing  them
an emission function for pollutants by farm  activi-  with the  actual yields of the region  using a regres-
ties:  sion  analysis.  The simulated  yields  were  found to
(6)  NS  = (p  (p,•  M).  be reasonable  in predicting mean crop yields.  The
simulated  yields were  further  validated  using ex-
The  farm  decision-making  framework  (repre-  pert opinion of agronomists  (Foltz et  al.  1995).
sented  by  equations  [1]  through  [6])  is  used  to  To  capture  stochastic  effects  of  weather  and
study the impacts  of selected nonpoint source  pol-  time, a set of twenty-five ten-year simulations  was
lution policies.  For the  sake of clarity, this frame-  performed  for  each  cropping  system  to  develop
work  is  disaggregated  into  two  subsystems:  the  empirical  crop yield  distribution by cropping  sys-
economic decision-making of producers (equations  tem,  input  level,  and  tillage  practice.  Apart  from
[1]  to  [4]  and  nonnegativity  constraints)  and  the  the  yield  data  of  each  activity,  nonpoint  source
biophysical  processes  (equations  [5]  and  [6]).  pollutants, including  sediment,  fertilizer  and pesti-
cide  loadings  in runoff water,  and  chemical  con-
taminants  attached  to  sediments,  were  estimated
Methodology  with  EPIC/WQ.  Simulation  of  cropping  systems
was  repeated  for  alternate  placement  of crops  in
To represent the two subsystems in equations (1) to  each sequence, that is, if the sequence had corn and
(6)  of  the conceptual  model,  we  use  a nonlinear  soybean,  the  simulation was  done  for a  sequence
mathematical  programming formulation combined  starting  with  corn  and  one  starting with  soybean
with  a  simulation  model.  A  DEMP  (Direct  Ex-
pected Utility Maximization  Problem) formulation
was  used to represent equation  (1).  This  formula-  EPIC/WQ  is an extension  of EPIC that includes water  quality infor-
mation. This  model  simulates the  effects  of soil, climate,  conservation
tion has  fewer  restrictions  on  the  form  of utility  practices, and crop  rotations on  soil erosion and other pollutants  includ-
function and the assumptions  regarding the distri-  ing  pesticides.  This  model  was  chosen  for  its  capability  to  simulate
bution of the random  variables  (Lambert  and Mc-  multiyear/multicrop  rotations,  ability  to provide  estimates  of  environ-
uton  of  the  random  varales  (Lamert an  mental flows,  computational  efficiency,  user convenience,  and accessi-
Carl  1985)  compared  with  the Expected  Income-  bility to  model builders.42  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
for each  weather seed. A  set of constraints  on per  watershed  was  studied  by  perturbing  the  system
acre  input  use  was  added  to  the  mathematical  using  taxing  and regulatory  policies  to  study  re-
model to perform policy simulation. Restriction  on  sulting changes.  We disaggregated  the income  ef-
aggregate  loading of pollutants  was also included  fects into both the mean and variance  to add infor-
by  using  a set  of equations  constraining  the  total  mation on the impact of policies. The impacts were
pollutant loads leaving the system. Background  in-  measured as percentage changes from the baseline.
formation  on land use  and cropped area for coun-  Policy instruments  evaluated in this study fell into
ties  in the watershed  was  obtained  from the  1992  three  categories:  (1) taxing:  increase  in  per  unit
agricultural  census,  and the  watershed  was  delin-  price  of inputs,  (2)  restricting input use  at the ag-
eated  using  GIS  (Geographical  Information  Sys-  gregate level, and (3) restricting input use at the per
tems)  with GRASS 4.1. 3 acre  level.  Thus,  a  total  of  six  policy  scenarios
The  revenues  for  each  ten-year  crop  sequence  (three types  on two  inputs, nitrogen  and atrazine)
were  calculated  using  historical  price  data  pub-  were  considered  in  this  study.  The  taxing  policy
lished  by  USDA  in Agricultural Prices. The net  attempts  to  reach  a  desirable  outcome  in  water
margins were discounted using the "All crop price  quality through its effect on farm profits, while the
index  (prices received)"  for Indiana, with 1980 as  aggregate  restriction  on  inputs  at  the  watershed
the  base.  A complete  mathematical  system repre-  level invokes  constraints  in allowable rates of pol-
senting  the  problem  was  programmed  using  the  lution for the  entire area.  The per acre  restriction
GAMS  (General Algebraic Modeling System) lan-  limits the producers in their choice of technologies
guage  developed  by  Brooke, Kendrik,  and  Meer-  that do not violate limits on the per acre input use.
aus  (1988).  The risk aversion  coefficient  was pa-  The  implications  of  policy  intensities  at  various
rameterized to test its influence on crop plans,  but  levels  were  evaluated  by  parameterizing  the
the  policy  analysis  was  conducted  using  a single  DEMP model.
risk aversion  parameter.
The  mathematical  model  integrates  both  crop
and  water  quality  information  into  a  direct  ex-  Results  and Discussion
pected utility maximization model. This model was
used to  derive  baseline crop  production  activities  Estimates  from  the  EPIC/WQ  model  (table  1),
and  corresponding  pollutant  loads.  The results  of  show that  organic  nitrogen  in  runoff was  lowest,
the base run were validated for the watershed using  compared with all other farming  systems,  under a
data  from Indiana Agricultural Statistics (USDA  com-alfalfa system  with low input use. Nitrates  in
and Purdue University  1992,  various volumes)  ag-  the runoff water were lowest (2.68 lbs. per acre)  in
gregated  over  counties,  and an  area  study  in  the  continuous corn under no till with low input use, in
region  conducted  by  USDA/ERS/Resources  and  contrast  to  corn-soybean-wheat  under  no till  with
Technology  Division,  (1993).  To  accomplish  this  high  input  use  (13.38  lbs.).  Nitrogen  pollution  in
validation,  the  base  plans  were  disaggregated  ac-  both subsurface and percolate forms was highest in
cording  to different  crops,  input  use,  and tillage.  corn-alfalfa rotation with high input use. Exposure
These were then area-weighted to derive allocation  to higher levels of nitrates in groundwater could be
under each in the optimal plan. These  area alloca-  a cost  associated with  increased  alfalfa acreage  in
tions  were used in comparison  to evaluate the  va-  the region (Foltz, Lee,  and Martin  1993). Phospho-
lidity of the base plan for policy analysis. The base  rus  contaminants  were  relatively  high  under  a
plan performed  well  in  representing  the  agricul-  corn-alfalfa  system  with high input use. Sediment
tural scenario of the region and was comparable to  loading  was  lowest in  a com-alfalfa  rotation  with
area studies and regional agricultural statistics. The  low input use (conventional till) and highest under
deviation  in  percentage  allocation  in  base  plan  corn-soybean-wheat  with medium input use  (mini-
compared with area statistics and statistics  was cal-  mum till).
culated  within  5%  for  the  area  under  individual  The  multiyear  cropping  and  pollution  loading
crops.  information  was  used in  the  farm decision  prob-
Mean income, variance  in income, and pollution  lem. It was  observed that  under risk neutral pref-
loading  were  calculated  using  accounting  equa-  erences, the optimal solution generated  specializa-
tions on the optimal variables.  The impact of poli-  tion in corn-soybean rotation with medium level of
cies on agricultural income and water quality in the  input use and no  tillage  (CS-MF-NT).  This  is be-
cause the ranking  is based on mean income (with-
out considering the risk involved), and CS-MF-NT
3 GRASS  (Geographic  Resource  Analysis  Support  System)  4.1  is  a  had the highest mean  among cropping  systems.
GIS  software developed  by the  U.S.  Army Corps of Engineers.  The results  of the  baseline run (100-acre  scale)Randhir and Lee  Impacts of Reducing Nitrogen and Pesticide Use  43
Table 1. Per Acre  Cropping System Simulation  Results








CC-LF-CT  264  20.98  2.68  2.68  4.46  31.22  3.01  0.99
CC-LF-MT  263  17.59  2.68  2.68  4.46  65.12  2.68  0.97
CC-LF-NT  262  17.39  2.68  2.68  5.35  93.66  5.47  0.97
CC-MF-CT  358  21.10  3.57  4.46  7.14  41.03  3.03  1.00
CC-MF-MT  358  17.70  3.57  4.46  8.03  92.77  2.86  0.97
CC-MF-NT  358  17.55  3.57  4.46  8.03  137.37  3.07  0.95
CC-HF-CT  365  21.35  4.46  7.14  16.95  51.74  3.27  1.05
CC-HF-MT  367  17.84  4.46  6.25  17.85  122.21  3.08  0.96
CC-HF-NT  371  17.83  4.46  6.25  17.84  183.76  3.38  0.93
CS-LF-CT  361  20.78  5.35  4.46  16.06  24.09  3.02  1.04
CS-LF-MT  364  17.12  5.35  4.46  18.73  53.52  2.70  0.97
CS-LF-NT  360  16.48  4.46  4.46  18.73  80.29  2.77  0.96
CS-MF-CT  370  20.81  6.24  5.35  24.98  32.11  3.16  1.07
CS-MF-MT  373  17.16  5.35  5.35  27.65  67.80  2.84  0.97
CS-MF-NT  377  16.53  5.35  5.35  28.55  102.59  2.94  0.94
CS-HF-CT  365  20.82  6.24  7.14  33.01  33.01  3.18  1.11
CS-HF-MT  368  17.20  5.35  6.25  36.57  81.18  2.96  0.97
CS-HF-NT  374  16.56  5.35  6.25  38.36  125.78  3.12  0.94
CA-LF-CT  301  8.36  7.14  8.92  62.44  415.69  2.42  0.48
CA-LF-MT  307  7.47  8.03  8.03  62.44  442.45  2.37  0.42
CA-LF-NT  314  7.36  8.92  8.92  62.44  472.78  2.44  0.41
CA-MF-CT  342  8.30  7.14  8.92  65.12  624.43  3.06  0.48
CA-MF-MT  343  7.46  8.02  8.92  64.23  666.36  3.07  0.42
CA-MF-NT  349  7.37  9.81  8.92  65.12  713.64  3.20  0.41
CA-HF-CT  341  8.31  7.14  8.92  67.80  832.28  3.72  0.48
CA-HF-MT  347  7.47  8.03  8.92  66.90  890.26  3.77  0.42
CA-HF-NT  355  7.38  9.81  8.92  67.80  953.60  3.96  0.41
CW-LF-CT  268  22.48  8.92  7.14  40.14  32.11  3.33  1.52
CW-LF-MT  272  17.51  9.81  7.14  40.14  79.39  3.00  1.11
CW-LF-NT  276  16.28  9.81  7.14  40.14  118.64  3.00  1.00
CW-MF-CT  316  22.35  10.70  8.03  41.03  44.60  3.47  1.51
CW-MF-MT  315  17.48  11.60  8.03  41.03  105.26  3.18  1.11
CW-MF-NT  318  16.30  11.60  8.03  41.03  161.46  3.27  1.00
CW-HF-CT  321  22.35  12.49  8.92  41.93  52.63  3.57  1.50
CW-HF-MT  325  17.53  13.38  8.03  41.93  130.24  3.39  1.11
CW-HF-NT  331  16.35  13.38  8.03  41.93  205.17  3.57  1.00
'CC:  continuous  corn.  CS:  corn-soybean.  CA:  cor-alfalfa.  CW:  corn-soybean-wheat.  LF:  low  fertilizer  level.  MF:  medium
fertilizer level. HF:  high fertilizer level. MT:  minimum tillage.  CT:  conventional  tillage. NT:  no  tillage.
21:  discounted income  stream  ($/ac).
30N: organic nitrogen  (lb/ac).
4NR: nitrogen  in run-off (lb/ac).
5NSS:  nitrogen in subsurface  flow (lb/ac).
6NP:  nitrogen in percolate  (lb/ac).
7PR:  phosphorus  in runoff (lb/ac).
8PS: phosphorus  with sediment (lb/ac).
9SL:  soil loss (t/ac).
under  a  relative  risk  aversion  coefficient  of one  area-weighted estimates of 55% of corn, 38.82% of
(table 2) showed diversification in cropping activi-  soybean,  4.39%  of  alfalfa,  and  0.46%  of  wheat
ties.  Increasing  the  value  of the risk aversion  co-  acreage.  The average  annual  nitrogen use  per acre
efficient  resulted  in  lesser  allocation  to  cropping  was  124.06  lbs.,  while phosphorus  and  potassium
systems with higher risk and further diversification  use  were  56.97  lbs.  and  91.76  lbs.,  respectively.
in optimal  plans.  The  optimal  plan under  relative  Nearly 38.09,  14.23, and 21.75%  of the  land were
risk aversion of one was more representative of the  under no  till, minimum till,  and conventional  till,
study area and hence was used as a baseline run for  respectively,  in the baseline results.
policy analysis. A comparison  with the results un-  The economic  and water quality implications of
der risk neutrality  explains  the  classical  financial  the baseline plan  are also evaluated.  An estimated
response to  risk through  movement  along  the  in-  16.46  lbs.  of  organic  nitrogen  pollutants  per  acre
come-risk frontier.  The baseline  results generated  was  predicted  in  the runoff  water. Nitrate  loss  in44  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 2.  Percent of Allocation  under  in  figures  1  and  2.  The  impacts  (in  percentage
Baseline  Scenario of Optimization  terms) are developed under taxing, and restrictions
are depicted  graphically for water quality  and eco-
Cropping  Cropping  nomic implications.
System'  Allocation  System  Allocation  Taxing nitrogen. Increasing the price of nitrogen
CC-MF-CT  1.9138  CS-HF-CT  2.2428  reduced the nitrogen pollutants in surface and sub-
CC-MF-MT  1.9195  CS-HF-MT  2.3873  surface water to a maximum of 2%  before substan-
CC-MF-NT  1.8857  CS-HF-NT  2.6401  tial income loses  were observed  (figure  1).  To re-
CC-HF-CT  2.2222  CA-MF-CT  1.1617  duce  nitrogen  pollutants  by  1%,  a nitrogen  tax  of CC-HF-MT  2.3332  CA-MF-MT  1.1843
CC-HF-NT  2.4971  CA-MF-NT  1.4627  400%  from the baseline  was necessary.  Reduction
CS-LF-CT  2.0558  CA-HF-CT  1.0950  in sediment  is responsive  to  a twofold increase  in
CS-LF-MT  2.1958  CA-HF-MT  1.3816  nitrogen price.  The sediment reduction  is substan-
CS-LF-NT  1.9776  CA-HF-NT  1.7663  tial (a maximum of 16%)  with a ninefold  increase
CS-MF-CT  2.4555  CW-HF-CT  0.1771
CS-MF-MT  2.6270  CW-HF-MT  0.3668  in  nitrogen  tax  level.  The  pesticide  contaminants
CS-MF-NT  59.4357  CW-HF-NT  0.6153  declined  at  a 400%  tax  level,  with  a  maximum
reduction  of only  5  to  6%  of contamination.  One
'CC:  continuous  corn,  CS:  corn-soybean,  CA:  corn-alfalfa,  notable  observation  is  that  nitrogen  taxing  in-
CW: corn-soybean-wheat,  LF: low fertilizer  level, MF: medium
fertilizer  level,  HF: high fertilizer  level,  MT: minimum  tillage,  creased  the  nitrogen contamaton  groundwa-
CT:  conventional tillage,  NT:  no tillage.  ter,  due  to  shifts  in  cropping  systems  toward  al-
falfa-based  cropping,  which uses less nitrogen but
has higher estimates of percolate  nitrogen.  The ni-
subsurface flows was 5.55 lbs. per acre, and loss of  trogen tax also resulted  in a slight increase  in total
the  mineral  nitrogen  was  5.73  lbs.  per  acre.  The  phosphorus  (runoff and sediment) pollution, due to
nitrogen  loss  through percolation  below  the  crop  an  increase  in  the  area  under  a  cropping  system
root  zone  was  29.55  lbs.  per  acre.  The  soluble  with lesser nitrogen use  and  phosphorus  pollution
phosphorus  in runoff was estimated  at  152.22  lbs.  than the  baseline levels.
and the phosphorus  attached  to  the  sediment  was  The  economic  impacts  of  this  policy  are  pre-
3.02 lbs. per acre.  Sediment generated in the base-  sented in the lower panel of figure  2. As expected,
line,  as  estimated  by  USLE  (Universal  Soil  Loss  the use  of nitrogen  declined  at  a constant  rate for
Equation),  was 0.55 tons per acre. Atrazine loading  each  increase  in  nitrogen  taxation  up  to  a  600%
was  estimated  at 0.192  gms  per  acre,  while  the  level.  A  maximum  achievable  level  of reduction
alachlor  level  was  0.233  gms  per  acre.  The  dis-  was roughly 20%  from the baseline,  with an elev-
counted mean of income  stream  of the farms was  enfold  increase  in  nitrogen  price.  While  atrazine
$370 per  acre, with a variance  of $210 per acre.  and alachlor use declined similarly to nitrogen use,
The implications  of policies  span dimensions  in  the rate of decline in atrazine  use was  higher than
tradeoffs  among  various  forms  of pollutants,  tar-  that of alachlor use in percentage  terms. The use  of
geted  and  nontargeted  contaminants,  agricultural  phosphorus  declined  very gradually  until  a maxi-
income,  and  income  risk  (variance  income).  To  mum  reduction  of  1.2%  from  the  baseline  was
enable  a clear understanding of these complexities,  reached.  The loss  in income  was  almost  linear in
a  graphical  representation  of the  impacts  is pre-  nitrogen  price rise.  Risk (measured  as  variance  in
sented  for each  policy  scenario.  By  graphing  the  income) faced by the farmers decreased because of
multidimensional changes  into deviational changes  a shift in  optimal  cropping mix with  a significant
from the baseline, the  impacts  of various policies  drop  after the 600% level of tax, until a maximum
can be compared.  The X axis indicates the level of  decrease  of 10%  was  achieved.
an increment in policy intensity compared with the  Increasing  the  tax  on  nitrogen  reduced  surface
baseline.  For instance,  in the  case  of a tax  on ni-  sources  of the pollutant  but resulted in an increase
trogen, at x  =  2,  the policy intensity is calculated  of nitrogen contamination of groundwater. Nontar-
as  100*  (2 + 1) =  300% increase in nitrogen price  geted pollutants like pesticides and sediments were
from  the  baseline.  The  changes  in  water  quality  responsive  to  nitrogen  taxing.  Because  farm  in-
and  economic  attributes  are  represented  on  the  Y  come  declined  and groundwater nitrogen contami-
axis  as percentage  deviations  from the baseline.  nation increased  under nitrogen  taxing, an optimal
level  of nitrogen  taxes  can be fixed after account-
Nitrogen-targeted  policies  ing for the tradeoffs  in water quality  benefits.
Aggregate nitrogen use  restriction. Aggregate
The  implications  of  nitrogen-targeted  policies  on  restrictions on nitrogen use showed varying effects
agricultural income and water quality are presented  on water quality and are presented in figure 2. WithRandhir and Lee  Impacts of Reducing Nitrogen and Pesticide Use  45
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Figure 1. Economic  and Water Quality  Implications of Nitrogen  Tax.
a 40%  restriction in nitrogen use, the groundwater  runoff  water.  Response  of  total  phosphorus  was
nitrogen  contamination  reduced  to  a  maximum  similar  to that of nitrogen in  groundwater but dif-
level  of  30%.  The  levels  of  these  contaminants  fered in magnitude.  The sediment  in runoff water
increased  for restriction above  30% from the base-  was  reduced  considerably  for  restriction  levels
line. Restricting  above  20%  of nitrogen  use  from  above  20%.  The  surface  and  subsurface  nitrogen
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Figure 2. Economic  and Water Quality Implications  of Restricting Aggregate  Nitrogen Use.
striction  in  nitrogen  use  occurred.  Restriction  of  The aggregate  restriction  in nitrogen  use above
nitrogen use  in aggregate  had a significant  impact  40%  was  detrimental  to  agricultural  income.  Re-
on  use  of all  inputs.  The  use  of phosphorus  and  duction  of  agricultural  NPS  pollution  can  be
pesticides  decreased  under this policy.  The  effect  achieved  with  restriction  in  nitrogen  use  up  to
on farm income was not significant for restrictions  40%.  For restrictions  higher  than  40%,  a  rise  in
less  than  40%,  after  which  the  income  loss  was  nitrogen  contamination  of  groundwater  and  in
substantial.  Agricultural  income  risk increased  by  phosphorus  levels of surface  water was  predicted.
10%  for a 40%  increased  restriction  and declined  Per acre nitrogen use restriction. Constraining
for increases  above  50%  in nitrogen use.  per  acre  use  of  nitrogen  restricts  entry  into  theRandhir and Lee  Impacts of Reducing Nitrogen and Pesticide Use  47
optimal cropping  plans of certain technologies  us-  elevenfold increase in tax, while atrazine pollutants
ing  high  amounts  of  nitrogen  fertilizer.  The  per  declined at  an eightfold tax. Nitrogen  pollution  in
acre restriction levels had varying  effects on water  groundwater  increased  from  the  baseline for each
quality. While not  shown graphically,  large  shifts  increase  in  atrazine  tax.  Surface  and  subsurface
in cropping systems  occurred  for restrictions of 6,  nitrogen was unaffected by atrazine taxes for 500%
30,  and 54%  from  the  baseline  nitrogen  use per  increases,  after  which  these  contaminants  in-
acre. At these levels, changes  in technologies  and  creased.
shifts  in  cropping  systems  were  observed,  while  The effect  of atrazine  taxes  on  input use,  agri-
water  quality  improved  substantially  from  the  cultural income, and risk are presented in the lower
baseline. Under all levels of restriction,  a reduction  panel of figure 3. The use of atrazine and alachlor
of 32%  of phosphorus  loading  was observed.  Es-  declined  steadily for all levels  of taxing. Nitrogen
timated  soil  loss  declined by  13%  from the base-  use  declined by 2%  for a  100%  increase  in taxing.
line for a 6%  restriction level  and by 16% for both  The use of phosphorus was  less  affected  (2%)  by
30  and 54%  restriction  levels.  Pesticide  contami-  this tax.  Farm income declined by approximately  a
nants declined by more than 10%  for a 6% restric-  5%  level at  all tax levels. The risk increased from
tion in nitrogen use. The reduction in nitrogen con-  the baseline, excepting for a 600%  level.
tamination  of  surface  and  subsurface  water  (tar-  In  summary, most of the water pollutants can be
geted  pollution)  was  less  effective  under  this  effectively  reduced with  taxing up  to  a 500%  in-
policy  type  than  under  the  aggregate  restriction  crease  from  the  baseline.  An  atrazine  tax  policy
scenario. Significant drops in total nitrogen use by  increased  nitrogen  contaminants  in  groundwater
5%,  in phosphorus  by  15%,  and  in pesticides  by  because  of  shifts  in  cropping  systems  involving
20% were  observed  for a  6%  restriction  from the  hhe  eolate  rogen  Risks  at  the
baseline.  This  6%  restriction  in  nitrogen  use  per  m  a  a 5 
acre reduced  the  choice  set of  available  cropping  iimum  at  a  500%  tax  lel.  re-
. . _.  n, tion was  maximum  at a  500%  tax  level.  The  re-
systems and resulted in a 5%  drop in total nitrogen  tion  t 
used in the entire  farm. Though  the meanduction  in financial risk  is due  to increasing  allo- used in the entire farm. Though  the mean income
cation of a cropping system that uses less atrazine of producers was  not severely  affected,  the risk in  ctn  o  a c  ing ssm  tat  ss less atrazine
but has lower financial risk and income. farm income increased substantially for all per acre 
restrictions.  Aggregate atrazine use  restriction. The  impact
To  summarize,  only  certain  levels  of  per  acre  on water  quality  was  within  20%  of the baseline
restrictions were effective in protecting water qual-  for restrictions up to 40% from the baseline (figure
ity.  The  most effective  restriction  level was  30%  4). The phosphorus pollutants  declined  initially to
from  the  baseline  application  rates.  The per  acre  13% and increased to a high of 75% at a 70% level
policy was  effective in reducing general deteriora-  of restriction.  It was  possible  to  reduce  pesticide
tion of water quality  only for a certain percentage  contamination  with higher than  15%  restriction  in
reduction.  Similar  results were  obtained  by Mapp  use. Estimated  soil sediments  declined  at most re-
et al.  (1994)  in the  Central High Plains. Under the  striction  levels,  except  for  60  and  80%.  The  in-
per  acre  restriction  scenario,  risk in  income  was  crease  at these levels is due  to adjustment  in crop
greatest because  of limited  adjustments  in optimal  plans  with  the  entry  of  a new  cropping  system.
cropping systems.  Surface  and  subsurface  nitrogen  pollutants  de-
clined  for  restrictions  above  40%.  As  expected,
pesticide  use  declined  at  all  levels  of  restriction.
Pesticide-targeted  policies  Most of the pollutants  declined from their baseline
for restrictions  above  a  20%  level.  A  significant
The  pesticide-targeted  policies  were  applied  to  drop  in  income  was  observed  with  restrictions
atrazine in this  study. The three policies  on pesti-  higher  than  20%  from  the  baseline.  The  risk  in
cides  were  similar in magnitude to those  of nitro-  income  dropped,  as  did  mean farm  income,  with
gen-targeted policies.  restrictions  higher  than  20%  from  the  baseline.
Taxing  atrazine. Taxing  atrazine  pesticide  This was due to entry of low-income cropping sys-
showed little response for levels below 500% from  ters with lower risk.
the baseline.  Taxing  beyond  this level  resulted in  Restricting  atrazine  use  on  the  aggregate  re-
reductions  in levels of phosphorus, pesticides, and  duced  the  use of  most farm  chemicals.  Pesticide
sediment loading (figure  3). The reduction  in sedi-  contamination  in  both  surface  and  groundwater
ments in runoff was  constant  for each  increase  in  dropped  for  restrictions  greater  than  10%.  How-
tax above 600% in price level. The alachlor level in  ever, phosphorus and nitrogen loadings to ground-
water dropped by 4% from the baseline level for an  water  increased  to  significant  levels  under  this48  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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Figure 3. Economic  and Water Quality Implications  of Pesticide  Tax.
policy.  Restricting  aggregate  atrazine  use  more  nitrogen  increased  from  the  base  levels.  A  large
than  20%  from  the baseline  was  found  to  drasti-  drop  in  sediments  was  observed  at  restriction
cally  affect  farm income  and risk.  higher than 24% from the baseline and a maximum
Per acre atrazine use restriction.  The results of  reduction  of  16%  was  observed.  The  pesticide
this  scenario are  not presented graphically  but  are  loading dropped  by  16%  for restrictions  that  had
discussed.  By  restricting  pesticide  use  at  the  per  higher than  a  36%  level  from the baseline.
acre  level, nitrogen  contamination  in groundwater  There  was  a major decline  in  pesticide  use  for
declined  at restriction  levels of 6 to 25%  from the  each increase  in per acre  use  restriction. Nitrogen






0  2  4  6  8  10
On percent increase in restriction
I  Surf/ Sub Nitrogen  Nitrogen  PerolateNitrogen  Runoff Phosphorus





0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
10n percent increase in restriction
—  Mean income  r  E  Risk (Variance)  IV  Nitrogen Use
—^—  Phosphorus Use  a  Atrazine Use  a  Alachlor Use
Figure 4.  Economic  and Water Quality  Implications of Restricting Aggregate  Pesticide  Use.
mained  at  baseline  levels  for  a  30%  restriction.  ineffective  in reducing  pesticide contamination  of
Farm  income stabilized after  an initial drop, while  water  because  of a shift to  cropping  systems  that
risk in  farm  income was  the highest  at the  6  and  used less pesticides but with a higher loading rate
30% levels. There  were  significant  adjustments in  into  runoff water. Most of the pollutants  affecting
technologies  at these  levels.  water  quality  increased  for  restrictions  less  than
In  summary,  a per  acre  restriction  policy  was  30%  from the  baseline.50  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Practical Caveat  However, policies targeted toward  a single pollut-
ant can  have cross  effects  on  other forms  of pol-
The existence of multiple and cross  effects among  lutants, agricultural  incomes,  and risk. These  im-
pollutants  is very  important  in  effluent  reduction  plications for nontargeted pollutants and farm risk
policies.  Targeting  policies  to reduce  a particular  have not always been considered in previous  stud-
pollutant  can increase other forms of the pollutant  ies.  There  is  also  a  need  to  study  the  nature  of
or other types of pollutants. Taxation of inputs  can  simultaneous  adjustments  in  cropping  sequences,
affect effluent discharges  provided a careful choice  input use  levels, substitution  in cropping systems,
is made on the tax level based on relative tradeoffs  profits, and risks facing the producers in a holistic
in the economic and water quality variables. Regu-  framework.  For this  a direct expected  utility risk
latory  policy can  also be effective  in reducing all  programming  framework  that  optimizes  cropping
pollutants  but  often  entails  high  monitoring  and  systems  over time  can capture  producer  behavior
enforcement  costs.  Monitoring  the  pollutants  and lead to  a better  estimation  of policy  implica-
through regular  sampling  and incentives  for  strict  tions. This is because of the model's lower reliance
compliance  with  the  standards  can  improve  en-  on assumptions  underlying the  distribution of sto-
forcement.  An  incentive  (penalty)  structure  for  chastic  variables.  This  study  attempts  to fill some
compliance  (noncompliance)  needs  to  be  devel-  of  these  voids  in  the  water  quality  literature  by
oped on the existing institutional structure of farm-  studying  the  economic  and  environmental  cross-
ing.  implications of water quality policies using a direct
Another  approach  is  to  proceed  indirectly  expected utility programming  framework  and bio-
through  the  plan developed  by  the  mathematical  physical  simulation.
modeling. Decisions  on the levels of pollutants are  The results of this study  show that policies tar-
made first and entered into the model. The optimal  geted  toward  a  particular  pollutant  involved
plans  generated  are  taken  as  a target  in  the  crop  tradeoffs with nontargeted pollutants, economic re-
management  and extension  programs.  Other regu-  turns, and  risks facing farmers.  Overlooking  these
latory policies and taxes can be directed to achieve  implications  can have undesirable  spillover effects
this  target.  Compliance  to  aggregate  restrictions  (new  pollutant  problems,  increased  risk,  and  so
can be achieved through  encouraging regional co-  forth). Careful analysis of these tradeoffs can lead
operation  in maintaining  water quality.  Incentives  to  cost-effective  policies  toward  protecting  water
to  cooperate  arise from  a higher disparity  in pen-  quality. Input price policies, besides directly reduc-
alties between a noncooperative pollution level and  ing  targeted  pollutants,  can  also  reduce  certain
a cooperative level. The cross effects  of the choice  nontargeted  pollutants  but  need  higher  price  in-
of  cropping  systems  on  pollutant  loads  constitute  creases to achieve a relatively small impact on wa-
important information that needs to be made avail-  ter quality.  It was  also  observed  that nitrogen  tax
able  to producers  in  the  watershed.  Carrying  out  actually increased  groundwater pollution  of nitro-
per acre restrictions involves identification  of crop-  gen because  economic and environmental implica-
ping  systems  that  have  higher pollution  potential  tions  of  this  policy  involved  movement  along  a
and regulating allocation to those activities. Again,  multidimensional  surface  involving  tradeoffs
a penalty  system that charges  for each  acre  of re-  among attributes.  Cropping systems that use  lower
stricted  cropping  system  can  be  used  to  achieve  levels of nitrogen  but have higher groundwater ni-
this approach.  For example,  nitrogen in runoff wa-  trogen  pollution  entered  the  optimal  plan under  a
ter is  high  under  a  corn-soybean-wheat  cropping  nitrogen  tax policy.
system  with high fertilizer  use  and  no  till. By re-  Particular levels  of taxing and restriction  of in-
ducing  per  acre  allowable  nitrogen  loading to  13  put  use  allowed  general  improvement  in  water
lbs., those acres under this cropping system can be  quality, with less loss in farm income and financial
regulated by a higher penalty for each pound above  risk  than  did  others.  Nonetheless,  most  policies
the allowable  limit.  were ineffective in reducing groundwater contami-
nation  of nitrogen  and  in  certain  cases  increased
the level. Targeting  for per acre reduction in nitro-
Conclusion  gen  and pesticides  decreased  certain forms  of tar-
geted  pollutants  but  increased  the  levels  of other
Water  quality  deterioration  through  agricultural  nontargeted  pollutants.  Per  acre  regulation  was
NPS  pollution  is  a serious  problem  facing  policy  highly effective  in achieving  substantial reduction
makers. Indirect policy instruments that change in-  of nonpoint  pollution in the watershed. The  meth-
put  use, cropping  systems,  and  technologies  have  ods of regulation  (per acre or aggregate) had vary-
been  successfully  used  as  water  quality  policies.  ing effectiveness  on water  quality. Regulating  ag-Randhir and Lee  Impacts of Reducing Nitrogen and Pesticide Use  51
gregate  input  use  levels  was  also  effective  and  Belt:  A  Multi  Criteria Decision  Approach."  Ph.D.  diss.,
allowed  flexibility  in  choice  of technologies  (ac-  Department  of Agricultural  Economics,  Purdue  Univer-
cording  to  site  considerations  of the  watershed).  Sity
Input use and pollutant loadings  responded well to  Foltz,  J.C., J.G. Lee, and M.A. Martin.  1993.  "Farm-level Eco-
per  acre  regulations  but  increased  financial  risk.  nomic  and Environmental  Impacts  of Eastern  Corn  Belt
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ply with the regulatory standards.  The existing in-  eling  Using Direct  Solution  of Nonlinear  Approximations
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